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Abstract1
Using data on agricultural traders in Madagascar, this paper shows that social network cap-
ital has a large effect on ﬁrm productivity. Better connected traders have signiﬁcantly larger sales
and value added than less connected traders after controlling for physical and human inputs as
well as for entrepreneur characteristics. The analysis indicates that three dimensions of social
network capital should be distinguished: relationships with other traders, which among other
things help ﬁrms economize on transactions costs; relationships with potential lenders; and fam-
ily relationships, which reduce efﬁciency, possibly because of the blurring of ﬁrm boundaries.
We ﬁnd no evidence that social capital favors collusion.
________________
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Agency for International Development.Social sciences have long recognized the role that social capital play in facilitating human
interaction (e.g., Coleman (1988), Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), Granovetter (1985)).
Unlike human capital, however, which now is seen as a fundamental dimension of most
economic processes, the concept of social capital has yet been little used in economics (e.g.,
Narayan and Pritchett (1996), Barr (1997, 1998), Fafchamps (1998), Fafchamps and Lund (1998))
and is still regarded with suspicion by many. This paper contributes to the debate by providing
evidence that social capital has a large signiﬁcant effect on the performance of economic agents
beyond those of physical and human capital. We demonstrate that certain types of social net-
works are more valuable than others and we throw some much needed light on some of the possi-
ble channels through which social capital affects economic efﬁciency.
One of the reasons why economists are weary of using the term social capital is that its
meaning is imprecise. From an economist’s point of view, there are at least two meanings of the
phrase that must be clearly distinguished. The ﬁrst meaning sees social capital as a ’stock’ of
trust and an emotional attachment to a group or society at large that facilitate the provision of
public goods. Examples of this deﬁnition of social capital can be found in the works of Coleman
(1988) and Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993): Coleman (1988) argues that kids perform better
in school when parents get involved running the school; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993)
argue that historical differences in levels of trust between individuals account for the diverging
economic experiences of northern and southern Italy because it affected ﬁrms’ ability to contract
with each other. Greif (1994) makes a related point with respect to medieval traders on both sides
of the Mediteranean. Further examples can be found in the works of Platteau (1994), Gambetta
(1988), Fukuyama (1995), and others.
A second meaning sees social capital as an individual asset that beneﬁts a single individual
or ﬁrm; this meaning is sometimes referred to as social network capital to emphasize that agents
derive beneﬁts from knowing others with whom they form networks of interconnected agents.2 
Labor economists and sociologists, for instance, have long recognized that knowing potential
employers helps people ﬁnd a job and that referral plays a key role in the way job markets
operate (e.g., Montgomery (1991), Granovetter (1995)). The importance of long term relation-
ships has also been emphasized in the industrial organization literature as facilitating credit,
sub-contracting, just-in-time inventory systems, and the like (e.g., Lorenz (1988), Aoki (1984)).
The two meanings of social capital are, of course, connected.2 Kranton (1996), for instance,
demonstrates how a decentralized network of pairwise interactions can help agents economize on
search costs, thereby providing an economic efﬁciency gain to the group. Drawing upon the work
of Ghosh and Ray (1996), Fafchamps (1998) shows that, by sharing information on bad payers in
a decentralized manner, agents can economize on screening costs. Groups that share information
more efﬁciently are better able to enforce contracts and thus to adapt, expand, and overtake oth-
ers (e.g., Fafchamps (1998)). This work and that of others (e.g., Platteau (1994), Tadelis (1998))
illustrate how individuals pursuing their self interest by forming relationships with others -- the
second meaning of social capital -- may lead to equilibria in which agents expect others to
behave in a trustworthy manner -- the ﬁrst meaning of social capital.
Understanding the role that social capital plays in market exchange is not just a playtoy for
theorists, it is also crucial for policy, particularly for the design of institutions that support mark-
ets. To understand what functions these institutions must provide, it is useful to examine the role
that relationships play in actual markets and the different channels through which they assist
market exchange (e.g., Barrett (1997a), Knack and Keefer (1997), Schmid and Robison (1995)).
To this effect, this paper investigates whether social capital affects the performance of agricul-
tural traders in the island of Madagascar. Markets for agricultural food products in Madagascar
________________
2 As Knack and Keefer (1997) have argued, interpersonal relations and trust are conceptually and empirically not
the same thing. In practice, the traders we spoke to all make a strong link between the two. Past business interaction,
provided it is successful, is nearly always a prerequisite for trust. Similarly, when trust is present, it normally
manifests itself as an interpersonal relationship. In our analysis, therefore, we do not attempt to disentangle the two
although our emphasis is on relationships.3 
were progressively liberalized in the 1980’s (e.g., Berg (1989), Dorosh and Bernier (1994), Shut-
tleworth (1989)), leading to massive trader entry (e.g., Barrett (1997b)). Using detailed data col-
lected on a sample of traders, this paper investigates whether well connected traders sell more
and make larger gross proﬁts than others. Section 1 presents the conceptual framework behind
our work and brieﬂy discusses the testing strategy. The data and survey methodology are dis-
cussed in Section 2. Returns to social capital are estimated and tested in Section 3. Section 4
examines whether social capital favors collusion while Section 5 investigates the channels
through which social capital facilitates exchange and raises traders’ efﬁciency. Conclusions are
presented at the end.
Section 1. Concepts and Testing Strategy
Economists normally think of production as depending on a series of resources under the
control of the producing ﬁrm. These resources typically include physical and human capital as
well as the management capabilities of the ﬁrm’s owner or board of directors. Production
efﬁciency depends on what takes place within the ﬁrm: combining factors of production in ways
that maximize output; purchasing inputs in proportions to their relative prices; etc. The way in
which the ﬁrm relates to the market is supposed not to affect production efﬁciency. When ﬁrms
buy and sell on perfect markets, this is the correct approach because the relationships that
economic agents have with each other are irrelevant: with full information and perfect enforce-
ment of contracts, agents can change suppliers and clients costlessly in response to minute varia-
tions in publicly known prices. Relationships confer no advantage over the market; they have no
value.
Ignoring social capital, however, is no longer valid when markets are imperfect. In that
case, relationships may convey information that minimize search costs, as in Kranton (1996), or
they may facilitate the enforcement of contracts, as in Fafchamps (1998). Thanks to better
enforcement of contracts, agents may be able to conduct business in a more efﬁcient manner.4 
Whenever trust is present, agents can lower their guard and economize on transactions costs such
as the need to inspect quality before buying or the need to organize payment in cash at the time
of delivery. Trust therefore enables agents to place and take orders, pay by check, use invoicing,
provide trade credit, and offer warranty -- all features of markets that we take for granted but that
are often dramatically absent from liberalized markets in poor countries (e.g., Fafchamps (1996,
1997), Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)). Trust also makes it easier for agents to renegotiate their
contractual obligations when problems arise, thereby providing much needed ﬂexibility in deal-
ing with external shocks (e.g., Bigsten et al. (2000)). Finally, it facilitates the circulation of reli-
able information about technology and market opportunities, as well as the blacklisting of unreli-
able agents (e.g., Barr (1997, 1998), Greif (1993)). Relationships and social networks may thus
enable agents to economize on transactions costs even though they would probably fail to
achieve the same level of aggregate efﬁciency as perfect markets.
The existence of close personal relationships between agents may also facilitate -- or signal
-- collusion. It is a commonly held view among African politicians and the public alike that large
traders of food products collude to raise consumer prices and reduce producer prices by forming
a cartel and stockpiling grain. This view is often at the root of government intervention in agri-
cultural markets.3 It is thus unclear whether social capital should be viewed as an imperfect
response to the absence of perfect market, or to the cause of market imperfection itself. Which of
the two explanations -- collusion or reduction in transactions costs -- is responsible for the suc-
cess of better connected agents is therefore critical for policy making: if social network capital
serves primarily to restrict entry and artiﬁcially raise trade margins, it should be combated; if in
contrast relationships increase trade efﬁciency, they should be encouraged.
________________
3 The irony is that government interventions often have the effect of restricting competition and favoring
politically connected individuals (e.g., Staatz, Dione and Dembele (1989), Morris and Newman (1989), Bevan,
Collier and Gunning (1989)).5 
Having clariﬁed the reasons why network capital may affect competition and efﬁciency, we
now present our testing strategy. The ﬁrst step is to show that social network capital affects ﬁrm
performance. Consider a ﬁrm with physical, human, and social capital denoted K, H, and S,
respectively. Let its production function be denoted:
V = F(L, K, H, S) (1)
where V and L stand for value added and labor, respectively. If social capital is irrelevant for the
ﬁrm’s performance -- for instance because markets are nearly perfect or because collusion is not
possible -- S should have no effect on output once we control for L, K, and H. Suppose, however,
that ﬁrms with better contacts rotate their working capital faster (e.g., speedier search) or require
less labor (e.g., streamlined quality inspection). Social capital S should raise the productivity of
labor, physical, and human capital and thus enters the regression as productivity shifter. If S has a
signiﬁcant positive effect on V, this shows that ﬁrms with more social capital get more return
from their labor and physical and human capital.4 A similar approach is used by Barr (1997).
For this approach to be convincing, estimation of equation (1) must yield consistent param-
eter estimates. The usual caveats about the possible endogeneity of social capital and other fac-
tors of production apply. It is, for instance, likely that social capital is accumulated over time as
traders get to know each other through business interaction.5 In this respect, social capital is
similar to physical capital, which among small ﬁrms is typically accumulated over time through
reinvestment of past proﬁts (e.g., Bigsten et al. (1999)).6 The fact that social capital is
________________
4 Note that this approach does not distinguish between productivity gains that are due to network externalities
from those that result from returns internal to the ﬁrm.
5 The social capital literature in the social sciences has generally emphasized the idea that socializing has beneﬁts
that extend beyond its initial purpose. Social capital is then seen as an ’externality’ that facilitates other subsequent
exchanges (e.g., Coleman (1988), Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993)). Although this view is not inconsistent with
the approach adopted here, it is not central to our estimation strategy.
6 It could be argued that social capital differs from physical capital in that it is not deliberately accumulated at a
cost to the entrepreneur, but is an automatic by-product of past business activity. In the absence of data on the time
and efforts devoted to establishing and maintaining business contacts, it is difﬁcult to evaluate to what extend social
capital accumulation is deliberate or not. Discussions with respondents nevertheless suggest that maintaining an
extensive and up-to-date network of business contacts is not costless: socializing is time consuming and often involves
out-of-pocket expenses such as meals and drinks.
However, even if accumulation was costless and automatic, it would not mean that social capital is useless.
Work experience is by and large an automatic by-product of work, yet no one doubts that in many instances it raises6 
accumulated over time does not mean it is not important: physical capital is also accumulated
over time yet no one doubts that it helps production. But it means that social and physical capital
are susceptible of endogeneity bias.7 Time-invariant factors that raised past proﬁts, such as busi-
ness acumen and other personal characteristics of the entrepreneur, would also favor the accumu-
lation of physical and social capital. If these time-invariant factors are not observed by the
econometrician, this results in omitted variable bias: accumulated factors capture not only their
own effect on proﬁts, but also the effect of unobservable characteristics. One way to correct for
this bias would be to use panel data. Unfortunately, such data are not available at this point. We
therefore resort to an instrumental variable approach. Fortunately, numerous instruments have
been collected during the survey in anticipation of this problem. We further seek to minimize
omitted variable bias by including additional regressors that may be correlated with social capital
and could, if omitted, artiﬁcially raise the coefﬁcient on social capital.
Perhaps the deﬁnitive way of convincing the reader that network capital matters is to show
that it is useful for some of the activities of the ﬁrm, and to demonstrate that these activities help
the ﬁrm’s output. After all, economist, as a rule, accept the presence of physical capital and labor
in the production function not because these variables have tested free of omitted variable bias,
but because economists believe that ﬁrms cannot produce without capital and labor. This convic-
tion does not derive from econometric evidence but rather from our understanding of how the
world works. The same reasoning applies to social capital. Anyone who has tried to make a liv-
ing from buying and selling knows that survival in business is impossible without contacts.8
Although this realization has long reached other social sciences, it is not yet widely accepted in
________________
productivity. The same reasoning applies to business contacts: they can be useful even if they were obtained at no
cost. In our regression analysis, business experience is controlled for separately from social capital.
The fact that accumulating and maintaining social contacts is time consuming tends to bias the coefﬁcient of
social capital downward because the time the entrepreneur spends on contacts is not subtracted from labor time.
7 By extension, endogeneity bias may also affect variable inputs such as labor that are adjusted to the level of
semi-ﬁxed factors.
8 This is so true that the client base of a ﬁrm has a legally recognized value as part its ’goodwill’.7 
economics.
We therefore examine the channels through which social capital raises individual produc-
tivity. One possible channel is through collusion and imperfect competition; another channel is
through the reduction of transactions costs. To investigate the ﬁrst channel, we decompose total
value added V into two parts: quantities sold Q and unit margin, that is, for traders, the difference
between buying and selling price Ps-Pb. By deﬁnition, V = Q(Ps-Pb). We would expect collud-
ing ﬁrms to reduce traded volume Q in order to artiﬁcially raise Pb and reduce Ps, thereby raising
the unit margin Ps-Pb. If social capital raises V through collusion, we would therefore expect it
to have a strong positive effect on unit margin and a negative effect on quantities. Such a test is
conducted in Section 4.
In contrast, if social capital raises productivity by reducing transactions costs, we should be
able to show (1) that social capital helps ﬁrm economize on certain transactions costs and (2) that
lower transactions costs raise output.9 To this effect, we investigate several channels through
which social capital may facilitate ﬁrms’ operations. Channel variables, denoted as vector C,
capture the degree of sophistication in the way the ﬁrm deals with clients and suppliers. For the
ﬁrst part of our demonstration, we regress C on S, controlling for other variables susceptive of
inﬂuencing C:i fS has the right sign and is signiﬁcant, this serves as evidence that social capital
plays a identiﬁable role in how ﬁrms deal with each other. The second part of our demonstration
is achieved by expanding equation (1) to include the possible effect of C on output:
V = F(L, K, H, S; C) (2)
Having described the testing strategy, we now turn to the data and estimation itself.
________________
9 This is a conservative test: social capital may matter in other ways that this method does not control for. It could,
for instance, economize on the manager’s time, thereby enabling the owner/manager to devote more time to other
activities, such as running another business or undertaking household chores.8 
Section 2. The Data
A survey of agricultural traders was conducted in Madagascar in a joint project between
IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research Institute) and the local Ministry of Scientiﬁc
Research (FOFIFA). The ﬁrst part of the survey was held between May 1997 and August 1997
and collected information on the individual characteristics of traders and on the structure, con-
duct, and performance of the trading sector. A second series of interviews were conducted
between September 1997 and November 1997; they focused on the nature of respondents’ rela-
tionships with other traders, clients, and suppliers.
The sample design was constructed so as to be as representative as possible of all the
traders involved in the whole food marketing chain from producer to consumer, wherever
located. Three main agricultural regions were covered (Fianarantsoa, Majunga, and
Antananarivo) and the sampling frame within these regions was set up so as to cover traders
operating at three different levels:
(1) Traders operating in big and small urban markets in the main town of every province (fari-
tany) and district (ﬁvondronana). These traders are mostly wholesalers, semi-wholesalers,
and retailers.
(2) Urban traders located outside the regular markets. These often are bigger traders, processors
(e.g., rice millers), and wholesalers.
(3) Traders operating on rural markets at the level of the rural county (ﬁraisana). These are
mostly big and small assemblers and itinerant traders. Rural ﬁraisanas were selected through
stratiﬁed sampling based on agro-ecological characteristics so as to be representative of the
various kind of marketed products and marketing seasons.10
________________
10 The sampling frame was constructed as follows. In each chosen locality (or neighborhood, in the case of the
capital city). all wholesalers and large collectors were identiﬁed through local authorities, direct observation, and
discussion with traders. A census was also taken to enumerate all smaller traders, including store fronts, retailers, and
itinerant retailers. A random sample was then drawn. In order to increase intra-sample variation, an effort was made
to oversample large traders by instructing enumerators to interview all large traders with a maximum of 20 per
locality (one third of the sample). In practice, this maximum was never reached, except in the capital city. Other9 
The survey focused on traders that marketed locally consumed staples such as rice, cas-
sava, potatoes, beans, and peanuts. The different forms in which these products are marketed
were taken into consideration, i.e., paddy and milled rice, maize and maize ﬂour, etc. Traders
involved primarily in export crops, fruits, vegetables, and minor crops were excluded. Most sur-
veyed traders -- 67% -- report rice or paddy as the agricultural product they trade most inten-
sively. This reﬂects the importance of rice as the main staple food in the country. Other most
actively traded products are beans and lentils (18% of the sample report them as their main
traded product), cassava (5%), potatoes (5%), peanuts (4%), and maize (2%).
A total number of 850 traders were surveyed in the ﬁrst visit, 739 of whom were inter-
viewed again a few weeks later. The analysis presented here is based on traders that could be
located in the second visit.11 The main characteristics of respondents are summarized in Table 1.
Since surveyed ﬁrms are traders, total sales are the relevant measure of output. Value added is
measured as the difference between total sales and total purchases in value; it represents the total
returns to labor, management, and capital. Value added is our preferred measure of output but,
because data on margins are subject to measurement error,12 we use total annual sales as an alter-
native measure of production.13
Detailed information is available on working capital and equipment (mostly weighting
equipment), storage capacity and vehicles, utilization of telephones and fax machines, labor,
management, human capital, and social capital. The data show that the surveyed businesses are
fairly unsophisticated by western standards: average working capital is roughly equivalent to
________________
traders were selected randomly on the basis of the census.
11 The category of traders which were hardest to trace during the second visit are those who are least formal and
have the least permanent form of operation. As a result, small itinerant traders tend to be underrepresented in the
results reported here.
12 Value added is computed by subtracting purchases from sales. Since both are subject to measurement error and
the average difference between the two is small, value added is much less precisely estimated than total sales or total
purchases. In addition, respondents often are reluctant to divulge their margin for fear that survey data will be used to
assesstaxes.
13 By deﬁnition, what traders produce is an intermediation service which is best measured by their total sales.
Inventories are minimal among surveyed traders and certainly do not extend from one year to the next (e.g., IFPRI
(1998)). Using annual sales and value added should thus be largely free of inventory bias.10 
2,000 US dollars -- a large number compared to the annual per capita GDP of Madagascar which
was 230 US dollars in 1997, but very small compared to the turnover of grain trading companies
in the U.S. or Europe. The great majority of surveyed traders do not have their own transportation
equipment, nor do they use fax machines or even telephones very often. Each trading business
has an average of four workers, including the owner/manager. Most respondents work full time in
trade and remain traders all year round. On average, they are fairly well educated by Madagascar
standards. In Madagascar trade is conducted in Malagasy, the national language which is spoken
throughout the island. French is commonly used in the administration and in some (primarily
urban) secondary schools. Close to half of the respondents commonly speak a language other
Malagasy -- mostly French.
Information was collected on various dimensions of the respondents’ social network: the
number of close relatives in agricultural trade; the number of (non-family) traders that respon-
dents know;14 and the number of friends and family members who can help the business stay
aﬂoat in times of trouble. These different dimensions of social capital are correlated, but only
imperfectly so. This should enable us to ascertain whether certain dimensions are more important
than others. We also observe little or no direct correlation between measures of social network
capital and ﬁrm size. The coefﬁcient of correlation between annual sales and known traders, for
instance is 0.05; it is 0.02 with family traders.15 The number of known traders is thus not a direct
function of sales: small traders may know many others like themselves. Similarly, there is no
noticeable correlation between total sales and the number of clients and suppliers known person-
ally by the trader -- 0.08 and 0.03, respectively -- the reason being that much trade takes place at
arms length among both small and large ﬁrms.
________________
14 To avoid double counting, the number of close relatives in agricultural trade is subtracted from the reported
number of traders known.
15 Correlation is higher when both variables are measured in logs: 0.34 for traders known; 0.22 for potential
lenders.11 
Section 3. Returns to Social Network Capital
Now that we have a better sense of what the data look like and where they come from, we
turn to the econometric analysis. The functional form used for regression analysis is basically a
Cobb-Douglas production function and is estimated in log form.16 Given the Cobb-Douglas func-
tional form, variables such as social capital that potentially raise the efﬁciency of labor and capi-
tal factor out as a Hicksian neutral multiplicative term, i.e., we have:
V = (g(S) L)a (h(S) K)b = g(S)a h(S)b La Kb = f (S) La Kb 3
where g(S), h(S), and f (S) are functions that express the effect of social capital S on the
efﬁciency of labor L and capital K. Estimates of equation (3) are reported in Table 2. Regressors
include (the log of) working capital measured in local currency and labor measured in person-
months. Since family workers may be more productive than hired workers due to moral hazard
considerations, the share of family workers in the ﬁrm’s workforce is included as well. Human
capital is measured by the trader’s years of schooling and years of experience. A dummy is
included that takes the value one if the trader speaks more than one a language.17 Gender is
included to control for various background characteristics (e.g., the difﬁculty to juggle business
and household responsibilities, restricted mobility, physical strength, fear of crime, discrimina-
tion). Ethnicity is not included due to the very small number of respondents (9) who stated an
ethnicity other than Malagasy. Social capital is measured by the number of (non-family) traders
known. Trade experience and social capital are entered in log form to account for the possibility
of decreasing marginal returns.18 Location dummies are added to control for differences in com-
petition and business environment across space. We expect factors of production such as working
________________
16 We experimented with translog and generalized Leontief formulations but, apparently due to heteroskedasticity,
they tend to perform less well than Cobb Douglas in least squares regressions. Quantile regressions on translog or
generalized Leontief formulations yield results that are qualitatively similar to Cobb Douglas, i.e., strong positive
coefﬁcient on social capital.
17 Usually French in addition to Malagasy, which all respondents know.
18 More precisely, the regressor used is the log of the number of traders/years of experience plus one to avoid
losing observations with no experience or social capital.12 
capital and labor to have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on output. We also anticipate that meas-
ures of human capital such as experience, schooling, and number of languages spoken should
have a beneﬁcial effect on productivity, together with social network capital. Gender should enter
negatively if women face difﬁculties entering the more remunerative side of the profession.
The estimation of equation (3) by ordinary least squares is presented in Table 3 for value
added and total annual sales, respectively. Results by and large conform with expectations.
Working capital and labor have the expected sign and are highly signiﬁcant. Returns to scale are
not signiﬁcantly different from one. Contrary to expectations, the presence of family members
among the ﬁrm’s labor force is shown to have a large negative effect on sales and value added.
Family members thus appear to work less hard than hired workers. One likely explanation is that
family members are present in the business more to keep company to the owner than to work.19
On the human capital side, schooling and business experience of the owner are shown to
raise efﬁciency, a result in line with other empirical evidence that the returns to human capital in
non-farm activities is high (e.g., Newman and Gertler (1994), Jolliffe (1996), Yang (1997),
Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998)). Schooling alone is signiﬁcant, however. Trade experience is
signiﬁcant only if social capital is omitted. One surprising result is that traders who commonly
speak a language other than Malagasy do less well than those who only speak the national
language.20 That speaking other languages does not contribute to efﬁciency in trade is a complete
surprise given that Malagasy is widely spoken throughout the country and is the language of
trade. But it should not reduce efﬁciency. One possible explanation is that those respondents who
report speaking French on a regular basis are not fully committed to a career in trade: they hope
________________
19 The owner may also work less when family members are around. Relatives may also be employed as part of a
social security system based on kinship, so that the decision to employ them is made without reference to business
needs. Yet another possible interpretation is that traders who operate multiple output ﬁrms in which trading is tied
with farming, processing, and transport, are both more prone to measurement error and more likely to delegate part of
their operations to family members.
20 Similar results obtain if we eliminate all non-native Malagasy, i.e., respondents who describe themselves as
Chinese, Indo-Pakistani, or something else: the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the language variable remain
unchanged.13 
to get an administrative job in the not-too-distant future and cultivate their French to enhance
their chances of getting such a job.21 Another alternative explanation is that traders who speak
several languages have a comparative advantage in other forms of trade, such as import-export.
Consequently, they divert part of their attention and effort to other trading activities that are not
captured in our measure of sales and value added.
Moving to the emphasis of this paper, results show that social capital raises both total sales
and gross margins even after controlling for working capital, labor, and human capital. The
estimated coefﬁcient indicates that the effect is large: keeping physical and human capital con-
stant, a doubling of the number of known traders raises sales and value added by 37% and 33%,
respectively.22
Whether these results are believable of course depends on the possibility of endogeneity
bias. We begin by testing whether capital, labor, share of family labor, and social capital can be
regarded as exogenous. Human capital and location variables need not be tested since
endogeneity is less of a issue. Hausman test results are reported at the bottom of Table 3. We
have at our disposal an unusually rich set of instruments. Those used for the test include personal
background variables such as age and age squared, various indicators of place of birth, religion,
number of brothers and sisters, number of children, profession, education, and business experi-
ence of parents, and history of informal lending and borrowing.23 Most of these variables are
beyond the control of respondents or are the result of past activity (e.g., history of lending and
borrowing). They should nevertheless inﬂuence access to capital, labor, and business contacts.
The number of siblings and children, for instance, should determine access to labor. Age and the
professional and education background of parents should inﬂuence prior exposure to trade and
________________
21 Thanks to Manfred Zeller for pointing this out.
22 Because social capital is entered as the log (social capital + 1), the elasticity with respect to social capital is
computed as coefﬁcient x average social capital /(average social capital +1).
23 A detailed list of the instruments appears in Table 4.14 
access to capital. Having lent to traders in difﬁculty in the past is a pointer for individual wealth
and willingness to help others. Place of birth and religion are likely to affect socializing patterns
and thus the accumulation of social capital.
Instruments are subjected to a Wald exclusion test suggested by Hausman (e.g., Greene
(1997), pp. 762).24 Results suggest that the instruments are valid (except for a marginally
signiﬁcant test result on parents’ education and experience).25 Using these instruments, we then
use a Hausman test to assess the exogeneity of capital, labor, and social capital.26 Exogeneity
cannot be rejected.
In spite of these encouraging results, we still worry that OLS estimates may be biased due
to simultaneity bias. If sales are high, traders may raise additional working capital, bring in addi-
tional workers, and make more contacts. The share of family labor might also increase if traders
rely on family members as supplementary labor during peaks (e.g., Fafchamps (1994)). We there-
fore reestimate the regression by instrumenting capital, labor, share of family labor, and social
capital. Instrumenting regressions are presented in Table 4. Results show that we have
sufﬁciently powerful instruments for identiﬁcation. At ﬁrst glance, the list of instrumental vari-
ables appears long so that one may fear overﬁtting. Most instruments, however, are dummy vari-
ables while others display little variation. Reported R2 do not suggest overﬁtting. Instrumental
variable estimates of returns to social capital are presented in Table 5. Albeit less precise, they
remains large and signiﬁcant. If anything, the estimated elasticity of value added with respect to
number of traders known has gone up as a result of instrumentation. Other relevant variables
________________
24 The test is constructed by regressing the residuals from the regressions presented in Table 3 on potential
instruments. The statistic TR 2 is distributed as a c2 with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of
tested instruments.
25 Exogeneity of these instruments cannot, however, be rejected with the expanded list of regressors used below,
suggesting that the ’false positive’ result is a consequence of omitted variable bias, not of endogeneity of the
instruments. For this reason, we decided to keep the instruments as listed.
26 The test is constructed as (bU-bR)(SU-SR)-1(bU-bR) where b and S denote the vector of estimated
coefﬁcients and the variance-covariance matrix, respectively, and the superscripts U and R stand for the restricted
(efﬁcient but possibly inconsistent) and unrestricted (consistent but possibly inefﬁcient) estimates. As suggested by
Hausman, the variance of the residuals from the unrestricted regression is used to compute SR.15 
such as labor, education, and experience, do not change sign but are no longer signiﬁcant.
To reliably interpret a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on social capital as evidence that it boosts pro-
ductivity, we must be reasonably sure that social capital does not proxy for something else we
did not control for. To this effect, we expand the regression to include a more exhaustive list of
regressors. First, we include equipment, storage capacity, vehicles, and multiple selling/buying
points as additional measures of capital. We expect these regressors to have a positive inﬂuence
on value added and sales. Second, we include indicators of commitment to the business -- such as
whether the entrepreneur is a full-time and year-round trader and is involved in another business
as well. We expect dedication and single-mindedness to be associated with higher productivity.
To the extent that less committed traders have fewer contacts, social capital could have picked
the effect of dedication to the business.
Third, social capital might capture the effect of communication equipment such as tele-
phone or fax machine. To minimize this bias, access to telephone and fax is included in the
regression as well. We expect communication equipment to increase the productivity of traders.
Fourth, we worry that the number of traders known may but reﬂect that the surveyed trader is in a
’cozy’ relationship with suppliers and clients. To control for this possibility, we include two vari-
ables indicating whether the respondent is sole buyer or sole supplier with some of its clients and
suppliers. We expect traders facing more competition to be less productive.
Fifth, the respondent may have inherited a network of contacts from its family, together
with coaching and ﬁnancial assistance at startup. In this case, social capital may simply reﬂect a
favorable family background. To control for family inﬂuences, we include the number of rela-
tives in agricultural trade as a separate measure of social capital. We expect relatives in trade to
bolster productivity, much in the same way as other forms of social capital. A slightly weaker
________________
26 Non-essential inputs such as equipment, storage capacity, and vehicles are added to the regression equation as
log(x+1). This avoids losing observations while remaining consistent with the use of logged sales and gross margins
as dependent variables.16 
coefﬁcient could be interpreted as evidence that strong links are less useful than weak links,
perhaps because they carry less information (e.g., Granovetter (1995)). We also include startup
capital and whether the respondent learned the business on his/her own, as opposed to learning
from a relative. To the extent that family support helps productivity, we expect traders who had a
lot of startup capital and were coached by relatives to do better. Finally, we include an alterna-
tive measure of social capital, namely the number of people from whom the respondent could
borrow in case of business difﬁculties. In contrast to the number of traders known which is
directly related to transactions costs, the number of potential lenders is more closely associated
with credit constraints and liquidity risk. Including it in the regression should provide an indica-
tion of what social capital is used for.
Simple OLS results are presented in Table 6. Working capital, labor, and number of traders
known remain highly signiﬁcant. In accordance with expectations, storage capacity is shown to
have a strong positive effect on value added and/or sales. In contrast, ownership of transport vehi-
cles has a negative (though non-signiﬁcant) effect on sales -- possibly because the survey did not
adequately capture the revenues of respondents engaged in transport as well as trade. Traders
with multiple selling/buying points are shown to nearly double their sales.27 Being a part-time
trader does not appear to have a noticeable effect on value added and sales, but year-round
traders tend to sell more. Results suggest that access to communication equipment has a very
strong effect on productivity. Given that very few respondents use these equipment for agricul-
tural trading purposes,28 this result should be taken with caution. It may just proxy for intelli-
gence and technological awareness. In agreement with expectations, more competitive relations
with clients are associated with lower value added. The opposite, however, holds for suppliers.
________________
27 Discussions with respondents suggest that the major constraint preventing traders from opening multiple
branches is the difﬁculty to monitor workers and prevent theft and embezzlement (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten
(1999b)). This issue deserves more research.
28 Five percent of respondents declare making use of the telephone in their trading business; only a handful ever
used a fax machine for business purposes.17 
Getting back to our main variable of interest, social capital, we see that both the number of
traders known and the number of potential lenders help raise productivity. The reason probably is
that different types of social capital play different roles. In this case, one serves to facilitate agri-
cultural trade while the other improves rapid access to credit. The magnitude of social capital
effects remains large: a doubling of the number of traders known and potential lenders raises
sales and gross margins by 19-22% and 18-22%, respectively. Endogeneity tests fail to reject the
hypothesis that social capital is exogenous. Hausman test results -- distributed as a c2 with 3
degrees of freedom -- are 0.3 (p value of 0.960) and 1.44 (p value of 0.596) for value added and
total sales, respectively. We also conduct a Davidson and MacKinnon endogeneity test (see
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), pp. 236-242).29 Test results, which are distributed as an F
statistic with 3 degrees of freedom, are 0.2 (p value of 0.995) and 0.48 (p value of 0.700). As in
the case of Table 5, instrumenting social capital anyway does not affect the results much: the
number of traders known is still signiﬁcant in both the value added and the sales regression; the
number of potential lenders is signiﬁcant in the value added regression.
One dimension of social capital -- the number of close relatives in agricultural trade --
appears with the wrong sign and is signiﬁcant in the sales regression. This result is difﬁcult to
explain. The beginning of an explanation is suggested by the fact that the coefﬁcient is no longer
signiﬁcant when the subsidiary dummy is omitted from the regression, and it gets smaller in
absolute value when we control for close interaction with businesses held by relatives.30 This is
consistent with the ideas that respondents who have close relatives in trade have trouble mentally
disentangling their business from that of their relatives and, as a result, tend to overreport the
working capital and equipment that is truly theirs.31 An alternative explanation is that close
________________
29 The test is constructed by ﬁrst regressing all potentially endogenous regressors on all the exogenous variables.
Predicted values of all potentially endogenous regressors are then added to the regression of interest, together with
uninstrumented regressors. Endogeneity is tested as an F test of the joint signiﬁcance of the predicted regressors.
30 E.g., whether main suppliers and clients are relatives, and whether the respondent raised funds from informal
sources -- presumably, relatives as well.
31 It is, for instance, unclear whether respondents make a sharp distinction between relatives working with them
and relatives operating a distinct business -- possibly because family helpers also operate on their own account. If this18 
relatives burden the respondent’s business by insisting on sharing arbitrage gains when they buy
and sell from each other.32 Because so few respondents buy and sell from relatives, the effect is
unlikely to be strong enough to account for the large negative coefﬁcient on relatives in trade. It
is also conceivable that the family serves to average out shocks so that productivity gains are
redistributed to family members in various insidious ways (e.g., gifts of stock, loan of working
capital).
Another possibility is that blurred business boundaries dilute incentives and result in lower
unobserved effort. We also ﬁnd that productivity is higher among traders who learned the busi-
ness on their own and did not receive coaching from relatives. These issues deserve further
investigation, but the results reported here certainly suggest that family relationships do not con-
stitute the only, or even the major component of social capital, contrary to what is often assumed
(e.g., Granovetter (1995a)). If anything, non-family networks are more important than family net-
works for success in business. This ﬁnding is to be compared to Bigsten et al. (2000), who simi-
larly report that family links account for only a minute portion of relationships in African
manufacturing.
In spite of our efforts to include all relevant factors, it is still conceivable that social capital
-- are other regressors -- are signiﬁcant because they proxy for unobserved entrepreneurial traits.
For instance, more thrifty and individualistic entrepreneurs might perform better and at the same
time accumulate more assets. Altruistic -- and presumably more sociable -- respondents might
________________
is the case, total reported labor, which includes family helpers, overestimates actual labor effort. This phenomenon
might explain why the coefﬁcient of family labor share is negative and signiﬁcant. By the same token, relatives who
are entrusted with part of the working capital of the respondent might rotate that working capital for their own
account, a practice commonly described for agents of Chartered Companies in pre-industrial Africa (e.g., Braudel
(1986)).
To investigate this possibility, we followed a referee’s suggestion and separated the relatives-in-agricultural-
trade variable between ﬁrms who employ relatives and those that do not. Blurring of ﬁrm boundaries should be more
severe for ﬁrms who employ relatives. We ﬁnd instead that the variable is most negative and signiﬁcant among ﬁrms
that do not employ relatives.
32 To investigate this possibility, we regress the buying price for rice on regional dummies, trader category, month
of transaction, and family relation with supplier -- 4% of traders report a family link with suppliers. The family
relation variable is nearly signiﬁcant (p-value of .15). We could not run a similar regression for sales given the
extremely small proportion of respondents who report selling to family members.19 
accumulate more business contacts while at the same time attract more customers. If social capi-
tal is signiﬁcant because it proxies for entrepreneur’s personal traits, then the inclusion of attitude
variables should leave social capital coefﬁcients non-signiﬁcant. To correct for this possible bias,
we include variables that capture the entrepreneur’s propensity to save and proxy for individual-
ism and altruism. These attitudinal variables were elicited by asking respondents to rank various
assertions as true or false (see Fafchamps and Minten (1999a) for details).33
Results, presented in Table 7, show that entrepreneurial traits affect ﬁrm performance:
traders who described themselves as self-reliant (’I solve my problems by myself’) and thrifty (’I
save when I make a lot of money’) are shown to be more productive. In contrast, fear of predation
by relatives seems to be a disincentive to effort: respondents who claim that, if they are success-
ful, their family and friends will live at their expense, tend to be less productive. Individual con-
trol over assets does not matter. Of course it would be foolish to claim that responses to a few
qualitative questions fully capture the respondent’s personality. It is also conceivable that
answers capture factors other than personal traits -- wealthier respondents, for instance, are more
likely to save than poor ones. Results should thus be taken with a grain of salt.
In spite of their shortcomings, attitudinal variables should nevertheless purge social capital
coefﬁcients of (some of) the effects of entrepreneurship. How does their inclusion affect the meas-
ured effect of social capital on productivity? Family members in agricultural trade remain a nega-
tive inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance, but the signiﬁcance of the variable drops below conventional
levels of signiﬁcance in the value added regression. Non-family network variables remain jointly
signiﬁcant, but the emphasis shifts to the number of potential lenders. The coefﬁcient on numbers
of traders known drops in both regressions and is no longer signiﬁcant in the value added regres-
sion. These results suggest that part of the measured effect of social capital on performance is in
________________
33 To minimize bias, the assertions were translated in Malagasy and enumerators were instructed to read the
assertions aloud.20 
fact attributable to entrepreneurial talent. Non-family social networks nevertheless maintain a
distinct positive inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance. Of course, there may exist yet other omitted
unobservables that bias our results. In the absence of panel data, these effects can unfortunately
not be controled for.
We also experimented with two measures of shocks: whether the ﬁrm has been victim of a
theft in the preceding year; and a measure of aggregate sales shock computed as the growth in
total annual sales enjoyed by traders in the same location and the same type of business (e.g.,
wholesale, retail, etc).34 The idea is that if social capital is but a by-product of past sales, ﬁrms
that grew rapidly over the last two years should have less social capital. If, in addition, sales
shocks are correlated, social capital may proxy for autocorrelated shocks. Including growth in
sales should minimize the possibility of such a bias.35 Regression results (not reported here for
the sake of brevity) indicate that past growth in sales is strongly associated with current sales,
suggesting that idiosyncratic sales shocks are positively correlated over time. If conﬁrmed by
more detailed time-series analysis on panel data, this ﬁnding has deep implications regarding
arbitrage and market efﬁciency: presumably, if competition is ﬁerce, any efﬁciency advantage
should be competed out over time. The presence of long-lasting idiosyncratic shocks suggests
otherwise and is consistent with Barrett’s (1997b) observation that, in spite of massive entry,
Madagascar grain markets remain uncompetitive. This issue deserves more investigation. Includ-
ing past shocks in the regression does not, however, reduce the magnitude or signiﬁcance of
social capital variables. We also ﬁnd that the occurrence of theft has no noticeable effect on per-
formance, although indirect costs might be large (see Fafchamps and Minten (1999b)).
________________
34 The ﬁrm’s own sales are omitted from the shock variable to avoid spurious correlation.
35 It should also reduce simultaneity bias.
35 We also tried to test whether knowing potential lenders helps deal with sales shock. To that effect, we crossed
number of lenders known with past sales shock: ﬁrms that know more lenders should have withered past shocks better
and might be in a better position now. Results have the expected negative sign but are not signiﬁcant.21 
Section 4. Testing for Collusion
Having established that social capital affects ﬁrm performance, we now investigate the
channels through which the effect operates. We begin by testing collusion. The approach outlined
in Section 2 requires that we split value added into unit margin and quantity sold. This decompo-
sition can only be done for an homogeneous product. Consequently, for the purpose of testing,
we focus on rice, which is the most widely traded agricultural commodity.36 To increase the
robustness of our results, unit margins that are unbelievably large or low are dropped from the
analysis.
Instrumental variable results are summarized in Table 8.37 Instruments used are as before.
Social capital is shown to have a very strong and signiﬁcant effect on quantities sold, but a nega-
tive and non-signiﬁcant effect on unit margin. In fact, we appear unable to explain much of the
variation in unit margin, which is dominated by regional differences. Controlling for rice type and
category of trader (collector, wholesaler, or retailer) improves the ﬁt but does not affect the con-
clusions regarding social capital (results not shown).
We therefore ﬁnd no evidence that social capital raises value added by raising the unit mar-
gin while limiting sales. These results suggest that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, the pri-
mary effect of social network capital on ﬁrm performance does not take place through collusion.
Section 5. Social Capital and Modes of Transaction
Having ruled out collusion as the most likely explanation for returns to network capital, we
turn to transactions costs. Although we do not have direct measures of the cost of transacting, we
have detailed information on the way traders deal with each other (Table 9). The data show that
traders collect price information primarily by talking with other traders. The information so col-
lected need not be accurate, however, given that traders have conﬂicting interest in taking
________________
36 Paddy is not included in the analysis.
37 Qualitatively similar results are obtained using quantile regressions.22 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities. A small proportion of respondents prefer to rely on informa-
tion provided by suppliers and clients. Since the interests of traders and their suppliers and
clients are contradictory, this approach is unlikely to yield accurate information unless respon-
dents have a long term relationship that ensures truthfulness. Some traders obtain information
from ’messengers’ instead, a more costly but probably more accurate method.38
On average, surveyed traders buy and sell mostly in cash. Invoicing and the use of checks
are virtually unheard of. A small but non-negligible proportion of traders nevertheless manage to
receive and grant trade credit, typically for a very short duration. Since respondents rotate their
working capital several times per month, even short term credit can signiﬁcantly add to their buy-
ing capacity. Traders nearly always inspect the quality of the food products they buy; this task is
so important that it is virtually always assumed by the owner/manager in person (see Fafchamps
and Minten (1999a) for details). Surveyed traders do part of their business with regular suppliers
and clients, with whom they are more likely to place orders and receive or grant credit and less
likely to inspect quality. This conforms with theoretical expectations according to which rela-
tionships facilitate search (e.g., Granovetter (1995), Kranton (1996)) and contract enforcement
(e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996), Fafchamps (1998)).
The data reported in Table 9 is suggestive of ways in which social network capital might
reduce transactions costs. The inspection of quality at each purchase, for instance, is a time con-
suming activity that is likely to divert the trader’s attention from other tasks. Consequently,
traders who have established a sufﬁciently strong relationship with their suppliers may skip qual-
ity inspection and reallocate their time to other business. Similar reasoning suggest that traders
who can trade with regular suppliers and clients should economize on search costs. By the same
token, traders should economize on information collection costs if they can rely on their clients
________________
38 Messenger is the name used by respondents to describe the practice of sending ﬁrm employees to investigate
prices and market conditions in another locality.23 
and suppliers for price information or if they can afford to send messengers to collect informa-
tion. Those who receive credit have more working capital to play with and should, other things
being equal, also be more productive and expand their business. Those who give credit to their
clients should similarly be better able to attract customers and compete successfully. Finally,
those who place orders can better plan and coordinate their activities.
We begin by regressing modes of transaction on variables suspected to inﬂuence the choice
between alternative ways of dealing with clients and suppliers, as well as a series of instruments.
Results of the ﬁrst step, presented in Table 10, indicate that knowing more traders helps collect-
ing price information from clients and suppliers directly; it also helps selling more on credit, buy-
ing from regular suppliers, selling to regular clients, and simplifying quality inspection by
clients. The ability to screen clients appears a major determinant of a ﬁrm’s willingness to grant
credit (e.g., Fafchamps (2000)). These results conﬁrm that social capital affects modes of transac-
tion through its effect on relationships (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)).
Schooling and experience are associated with more trustworthy modes of transaction as
well: the coefﬁcient of years of schooling is positive and signiﬁcant in the regular client and sup-
plier and quality inspection regressions. These results suggest that better educated traders are
more likely to realize the usefulness of more sophisticated ways of transacting, but that they can-
not capitalize on this understanding unless they have the necessary social capital.
Next, we investigate whether modes of transaction explain differences in efﬁciency across
traders. If an effect is found, it can be interpreted as evidence that social capital boosts perfor-
mance in part because it helps economize on transaction costs. A ﬁrst set of uninstrumented
regressions are presented in Table 11. Most coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant and have the right sign:
more sophisticated business practices are associated with higher ﬁrm productivity. Traders able
to rely on their clients and suppliers to gather reliable information about prices perform
signiﬁcantly better than those who must rely on the information provided by other traders like24 
them. Traders who use messengers to collect price information also do signiﬁcantly better. In
both cases the estimated effect is large and robust: reporting clients and suppliers as the main
source of price information is associated with a 60% increase in gross margin. Taken together,
these results indicate that access to accurate price information is a key factor in a trader’s suc-
cess. This is hardly surprising, given the importance of spatial and temporal arbitraging in Third
World staple food markets (e.g., Jones (1959, 1965), Dercon (1995), Baulch (1997), Ravallion
(1986)). They also suggest that better information can be obtained by establishing a good rela-
tionship with clients and suppliers (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)).
Except for the placing of orders, all the variables associated with more trusting ways of
doing business have the expected sign and many are signiﬁcant. Traders’ ability to sell on credit
is shown to be an important determinant of performance; since granting credit to clients is a
highly risky proposition (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999b)), ﬁrms better able to identify reli-
able clients appear to be at an advantage, even after controling for working capital, labor, educa-
tion, and the like. Having regular clients also appears associated with higher sales and gross mar-
gins. Not having to inspect the quality of supplies at each purchase is similarly associated with
higher sales and margins: given that quality inspection is virtually exclusively undertaken by the
owner/manager of the ﬁrm (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)), not having to inspect allows
the trader to devote more time to other activities and thus to do more business. Contrary to expec-
tations, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that place orders with suppliers get signiﬁcantly lower gross margins.
One possible interpretation is that Malagasy traders place orders only when they cannot ﬁnd
ready supplies; this interpretation is consistent with the fact that orders are often fulﬁlled late
(e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999b)). In this context, placing orders is a sign of weakness and is
associated with smaller margins.
The results provide important insights as to the particular role of different dimensions of
social capital: once we control for modes of transaction, only those dimension of social capital25 
that raise efﬁciency in ways other than by facilitating transactions should remain signiﬁcant.
Comparing Table 11 with Table 5 reveals that the inclusion of modes of transaction variables
leads the coefﬁcient of the number of traders known to drop in size and signiﬁcance. The
difference in minor, however: our measures of modes of transactions do not fully account for the
effect of social capital on trader efﬁciency.
The number of close relatives in agricultural trade continues to have a negative and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, thereby suggesting that the negative effect on productivity resulting from
having relatives in trade has little to do with transactions costs. This is consistent with our earlier
interpretation, namely, that traders who have close relatives in agricultural trade overstate their
own resources because they do not adequately distinguish them from those of their relatives.
Although the results reported in Table 11 demonstrate a strong association between produc-
tivity and modes of transaction, they are potentially subject to endogeneity bias since modes of
transactions are choice variables. We begin by conducting a series endogeneity test. Standard
Hausman and Davidson and MacKinnon tests are reported at the bottom of Table 11. They sug-
gest that modes of transactions can be regarded as exogenous. These tests, however, ignore the
fact that modes of transactions are limited dependent variables. We also report Davidson and
MacKinnon test results using predicted probabilities (logit) and censored predictions (tobit)
instead of linear predictions.39 Results appear at the bottom of Table 11. They suggest the pres-
ence of endogeneity in the value added regression. Consequently, we also report regression
results in which modes of transaction variables are replaced by predicted probabilities (logit) and
censored predictions (tobit).40
Results, reported in Table 11, are disappointing: except for sales to regular clients, which
________________
39 We also computed Hausman tests, but results proved very sensitive to the method used to invert the variance-
covariance term. For this reason, they are not reported here.
40 Given that it is unclear how a correction should be conducted, standard errors are not corrected for the use of
predicted variables.26 
remains signiﬁcant with the correct sign, other modes of transaction regressors either become
non-signiﬁcant or have the wrong sign. These results could be due to multicollinearity between
predicted modes of transactions, given that we do not have good instruments for the propensity to
rely on each particular mode of transaction separately from the others. To investigate this possi-
bility, we conduct a joint signiﬁcance test. Modes of transactions are jointly signiﬁcant in the
value added regression but not in the sales regression. It appears that, in this case, we have prob-
ably pushed the data beyond what it can reasonably show. Our results should nevertheless be
regarded as preliminary evidence that part of the efﬁciency enhancing effect of social capital
operates through the reduction of transactions costs.
Conclusion
There is a growing recognition that relationships play an important role in market
exchange, but what this role is and what function relationships play largely remain a mystery.
This paper provides a tentative answer to these questions using original data on agricultural
traders in Madagascar. We control for simultaneity with a rich set of instruments and minimize
omitted variable bias by adding variables that capture the personal characteristics and family
background of entrepreneurs. We complement our analysis with an investigation of the channels
through which social capital affects ﬁrm efﬁciency.
Results document the strong positive effect that social capital has on the performance of
agricultural traders in Madagascar. The strength and robustness of social capital variables stands
in sharp contrast with the less robust and partly counterintuitive results obtained with human cap-
ital variables such as years of schooling, years of experience as a trader, and the ability to speak
more than one language. Although this does not imply that human capital is unimportant, it sug-
gests that social capital might be as important if not more for efﬁciency in economies character-
ized by high transaction costs and poor market institutions (Fafchamps and Minten (1999b)).27 
Contrary to Knack and Keefer (1997), we ﬁnd that the density of interpersonal relationships
is signiﬁcantly related to trust and information ﬂows -- or at least, to their manifestation. Not all
relationships matter, though, which may explain why our results differ from those of these
authors. The evidence indeed suggests that at least three distinct dimensions of social network
capital need to be distinguished: relationships with other traders and with potential lenders,
which both raise productivity; and family relationships which, in contrast, appear to reduce it,
possibly because of the blurring of ﬁrm boundaries. Having family members in trade therefore
does not constitute the only, or even the major component of social capital, as is often assumed --
although it may help at start-up (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)).
Results indicate that social network capital enable traders to deal with each other in a more
trustworthy manner by granting and receiving credit, exchanging price information, and econom-
izing on quality inspection. We also ﬁnd preliminary evidence that part of the productivity
enhancing effect of social capital operates through the reduction of transactions costs. In con-
trast, we ﬁnd no evidence that social capital facilitates collusion. These ﬁndings suggest that
market efﬁciency could be improved by setting up supportive institutions to reduce transactions
and search costs and favor more sophisticated business practices. In the absence of data on the
effect of speciﬁc interventions, what form these supportive institutions should take remains
unclear, however. More research is needed.28 
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(3): 613-632, 1997.Table 1.  Dependent Variables and Regressors
Std. dev. Mean Unit Dependent variables
510437 196686 000 FMg. Total annual sales of agricultural food products
108653 29311 000 FMg. Total annual value added
Capital and labor
38176 10307 000 FMg. Working capital
10440 1993 000 FMg. Value of equipment
134 26 Metric tons Storage capacity
0.50 0.14 Number Number of vehicles
131.8 39.5 Month/year Manpower (in months/year)
30.0% 76.6% share % family labor in total labor force
Internal Organization
4.7% Yes=1 Multiple buying/selling points
87.3% Yes=1 Full time trader
83.4% Yes=1 Trader all year round
16.1% Yes=1 Owner/spouse has another business
Human capital
45.7% Fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
3.5 9.1 Years Years of schooling of owner/manager
4.5 6.0 Years Years of experience in agricultural trade
42.8% Yes=1 Commonly speaks a language other than national language
Social capital
1.2 0.7 Number Number of relatives in agricultural trade
9.1 8.8 Number Number of traders known
1.7 2.3 Number Number of potential informal lenders
Communication
56.5% Yes=1 Access to telephone
21.8% Yes=1 Access to fax machine
Competition
43.8% No=1 Main buyer from any supplier
21.9% No=1 Main supplier for any client
Startup history
52.2% Yes=1 Owner learned business alone
4283 2011 000 FMg. Startup capital
Location
15.7% Yes=1 In capital city
31.3% Yes=1 In another city
19.9% Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
24.9% Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
11.5% Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
12.2% Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
13.4% Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux regionTable 2. Effect of Social Capital on Value Added and Total Sales
(dependent variable is in log; estimator is ordinary least squares)
Total sales Value added
681 627 Number of observations
0.540 0.465 R-squared
t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. A. Factors of production
1. capital and labor
8.598 0.253 8.094 0.287 log Working capital
9.037 0.785 7.454 0.792 log Manpower (in months/year)
-2.896 -0.522 -2.424 -0.537 share % family labor in total labor force
2. human capital
-1.446 -0.135 -2.331 -0.261 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
1.938 0.031 1.683 0.033 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
1.032 0.076 1.318 0.119 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.850 -0.211 -1.942 -0.268 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
3. social capital
6.812 0.371 6.146 0.414 log Number of traders known
B. Location
-0.533 -0.178 -1.473 -0.903 Yes=1 In capital city
2.398 0.288 1.925 0.281 Yes=1 In another city
-0.897 -0.296 -1.391 -0.857 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-2.535 -0.834 -1.440 -0.880 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.409 -0.817 -0.967 -0.596 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-1.359 -0.479 -0.239 -0.151 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-2.293 -0.775 -0.114 -0.071 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
12.684 6.287 4.853 3.682 Intercept
Hausman (Wald) exclusion test:
p-value chi-sq. p-value chi-sq. df Intruments tested (1):
0.774 3.27 0.920 2.00 6 Personal background
0.401 4.03 0.507 3.31 4 Family size
0.052 18.19 0.618 8.11 10 Parents' education and experience
0.601 1.02 0.602 1.01 2 History of assistance
Hausman endogeneity test:
p-value chi-sq. p-value chi-sq. df Regressors tested:
0.339 3.37 0.860 0.76 3 Capital and labor
0.511 0.43 0.903 0.01 1 Social capital
(1) For the precise list of instruments used, see Table 3.Number of Family share Table 3. Instrumenting Regressions
traders known in manpower Manpower Working capital
704 695 704 678 Number of observations
0.249 0.221 0.411 0.376 R-squared
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. human capital
-1.555 -0.100 1.941 0.042 -2.914 -0.135 -4.251 -0.479 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
1.863 0.022 -3.174 -0.012 3.193 0.027 5.283 0.107 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
6.361 0.329 -2.233 -0.039 2.868 0.107 1.016 0.093 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-4.330 -0.349 -0.988 -0.027 0.885 0.051 -0.726 -0.102 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
B. Location
2.635 0.637 1.404 0.113 0.393 0.068 -4.012 -1.750 Yes=1 In capital city
-2.288 -0.198 3.066 0.090 -1.188 -0.074 1.075 0.161 Yes=1 In another city
2.755 0.652 -0.315 -0.025 -0.276 -0.047 -2.759 -1.165 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
0.952 0.231 0.710 0.058 0.461 0.081 -3.293 -1.426 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
0.510 0.127 1.391 0.115 -0.176 -0.032 -3.586 -1.591 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
0.332 0.085 1.790 0.152 -2.781 -0.509 -5.088 -2.314 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-0.609 -0.151 3.140 0.260 -3.124 -0.557 -5.228 -2.318 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
C. Personal background
1.302 0.024 0.115 0.001 1.640 0.022 3.124 0.100 Years Age
-1.287 -0.000 -0.909 -0.000 -0.722 -0.000 -2.255 -0.001 Years^2 Age squared
-0.088 -0.013 0.568 0.029 -2.231 -0.241 -0.806 -0.209 Yes=1 Born in capital city
0.085 0.008 0.019 0.001 -2.241 -0.146 -0.712 -0.113 Yes=1 Born in another city
-1.555 -0.107 1.654 0.038 -1.108 -0.055 1.051 0.127 Yes=1 Born at or near location of business
1.526 0.200 -1.735 -0.076 -0.433 -0.041 0.765 0.177 Yes=1 Religion other than christian
D. Family size
-2.061 -0.134 -0.938 -0.021 0.214 0.010 0.459 0.053 log Number of brothers over 15 years of age
-2.533 -0.166 -0.886 -0.020 1.130 0.053 0.540 0.063 log Number of sisters over 15 years of age
3.011 0.225 -0.817 -0.020 2.413 0.130 0.917 0.120 log Number of sons over 15 years of age
-0.893 -0.069 1.051 0.027 0.285 0.016 0.602 0.081 log Number of daughters over 15 years of age
E. Family background
-2.476 -0.273 1.462 0.054 -3.854 -0.306 -3.421 -0.662 Yes=1 Father was a farmer
1.609 0.176 -0.363 -0.013 0.224 0.018 1.409 0.271 Yes=1 Mother was a farmer
1.673 0.151 -0.762 -0.023 2.206 0.144 -0.573 -0.091 Yes=1 Father attended primary school
0.873 0.095 -0.498 -0.018 1.547 0.121 1.172 0.222 Yes=1 Father attended high school
-2.068 -0.189 0.907 0.028 -2.423 -0.160 0.241 0.039 Yes=1 Mother attended primary school
1.106 0.152 -0.665 -0.030 -0.960 -0.095 1.312 0.313 Yes=1 Mother attended high school
0.192 0.013 0.575 0.013 0.942 0.045 1.089 0.131 log Father's years of experience in business
-0.728 -0.050 -1.241 -0.028 -0.819 -0.040 -0.894 -0.108 log Mother's years of experience in business
-0.302 -0.025 -0.195 -0.005 -1.829 -0.111 -1.200 -0.180 log Father's years of experience in agricultural trade
-0.239 -0.020 1.060 0.029 2.060 0.122 1.738 0.253 log Mother's years of experience in agricultural trade
F. History of informal borrowing
-0.572 -0.061 -1.260 -0.046 2.345 0.181 3.342 0.628 Yes=1 Has lent to trader in difficulty in the past
-0.847 -0.087 0.583 0.020 -3.089 -0.228 -2.478 -0.450 Yes=1 Has borrowed for problem in business in the past
2.506 1.071 6.446 0.923 8.045 2.476 7.474 5.644 InterceptTable 4. Instrumental Variable Estimates
(dependent variable is in log; instruments as in previous Table)
Total sales Value added
680 626 Number of observations
0.489 0.448 R-squared
t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. A. Factors of production
1. capital and labor (*)
2.495 0.363 2.415 0.433 log Working capital
1.361 0.487 1.292 0.540 log Manpower (in months/year)
-1.701 -1.747 -0.130 -0.163 share % family labor in total labor force
2. human capital
-0.311 -0.036 -1.620 -0.223 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
0.481 0.010 0.970 0.024 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.117 0.011 1.251 0.147 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.415 -0.212 -1.293 -0.223 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
3. social capital (*)
2.274 0.462 1.816 0.473 log Number of traders known
B. Location
0.416 0.189 -1.380 -0.965 Yes=1 In capital city
2.269 0.345 1.115 0.203 Yes=1 In another city
-0.739 -0.277 -1.489 -1.086 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-1.727 -0.649 -1.537 -1.050 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-1.483 -0.581 -1.139 -0.801 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.531 -0.221 -0.516 -0.377 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-1.087 -0.444 -0.449 -0.337 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
4.363 7.226 1.670 3.205 Intercept
(*) Denotes instrumented variables. Instruments include all instruments used in Table 3Table 5. Controlling for Omitted Variable Bias
Total sales Value added (dependent variable is in log)
673 619 Number of observations
0.626 0.534 R-squared
A. Factors of production
t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. 1. capital and labor
6.230 0.190 6.096 0.229 log Working capital
1.271 0.031 -0.357 -0.011 log Value of equipment
5.541 0.232 3.990 0.219 log Storage capacity
-1.506 -0.294 -0.850 -0.217 log Number of vehicles
5.214 0.476 4.361 0.523 log Manpower (in months/year)
-1.529 -0.269 -1.761 -0.393 share % family labor in total labor force
2. internal organization
4.651 0.951 3.665 0.926 Yes=1 Multiple selling/buying points
-0.120 -0.018 -0.594 -0.127 Yes=1 Full-time trader
3.084 0.414 1.498 0.268 Yes=1 Trader all year round
0.727 0.088 2.593 0.399 Yes=1 Owner/spouse has another business
3. human capital
-1.146 -0.101 -2.179 -0.238 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
1.318 0.020 1.612 0.030 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.486 0.035 0.959 0.088 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.344 -0.146 -1.744 -0.237 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
4. social capital
-1.710 -0.158 -1.179 -0.139 log Number of relatives in agric. trade
3.855 0.219 3.289 0.244 log Number of traders known
3.828 0.319 2.408 0.257 log Number of potential lenders
5. Communication
4.083 0.415 2.873 0.369 Yes=1 Access to telephone
4.075 0.547 2.805 0.461 Yes=1 Access to a fax machine
B. Competition
1.059 0.117 2.222 0.303 No=1 Main buyer from any supplier
-2.751 -0.327 -3.380 -0.506 No=1 Main supplier for any client
C. Startup history
3.033 0.268 1.837 0.204 Yes=1 Owner/manager learned busines alone
2.020 0.050 0.871 0.028 log Startup capital
D. Location
-1.073 -0.350 -1.184 -0.709 Yes=1 In capital city
1.073 0.126 0.841 0.123 Yes=1 In another city
-0.934 -0.291 -0.940 -0.560 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.637 -1.210 -1.578 -0.952 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-3.454 -1.206 -1.236 -0.756 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-1.926 -0.672 -0.238 -0.147 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-3.005 -1.027 -0.400 -0.246 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
12.179 6.301 4.953 3.908 InterceptTable 6. Controling for Entrepreneurship
Total sales Value added (dependent variable is in log)
673 619 Number of observations
0.647 0.558 R-squared
A. Factors of production
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. 1. capital and labor
6.042 0.180 6.021 0.221 log Working capital
1.109 0.027 -0.562 -0.018 log Value of equipment
5.999 0.245 4.370 0.234 log Storage capacity
-1.362 -0.260 -0.663 -0.166 log Number of vehicles
5.091 0.456 4.299 0.505 log Manpower (in months/year)
-0.914 -0.158 -1.229 -0.269 share % family labor in total labor force
2. internal organization
4.958 0.990 4.041 1.000 Yes=1 Multiple selling/buying points
-0.033 -0.005 -0.550 -0.115 Yes=1 Full-time trader
2.962 0.389 1.598 0.280 Yes=1 Trader all year round
0.303 0.037 2.099 0.324 Yes=1 Owner/spouse has another business
3. human capital
-1.231 -0.105 -2.087 -0.223 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
2.192 0.033 2.385 0.045 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.479 0.034 0.919 0.082 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.544 -0.164 -1.918 -0.256 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
4. social capital
-1.921 -0.174 -1.577 -0.182 log Number of relatives in agric. trade
1.814 0.107 1.408 0.108 log Number of traders known
3.848 0.315 2.461 0.260 log Number of potential lenders
5. Communication
4.509 0.449 3.049 0.385 Yes=1 Access to telephone
3.718 0.489 2.503 0.405 Yes=1 Access to a fax machine
B. Competition
0.989 0.108 2.005 0.274 No=1 Main buyer from any supplier
-2.474 -0.289 -2.850 -0.421 No=1 Main supplier for any client
C. Startup history
2.888 0.250 1.389 0.152 Yes=1 Owner/manager learned busines by him/herself
1.492 0.037 0.227 0.007 log Startup capital
C. Location
-2.396 -0.792 -1.807 -1.075 Yes=1 In capital city
1.483 0.171 1.324 0.191 Yes=1 In another city
-1.120 -0.341 -0.911 -0.534 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-4.683 -1.571 -2.252 -1.348 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-4.612 -1.620 -1.899 -1.152 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-3.323 -1.181 -1.063 -0.659 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-4.281 -1.487 -1.145 -0.703 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
D. Entrepreneurship
-0.465 -0.040 -1.089 -0.117 Rank 1-5 Full control over assets
2.690 0.150 3.374 0.243 Rank 1-5 Self-reliance
-5.739 -0.198 -4.122 -0.177 Rank 1-5 Fear of predation by relatives
2.290 0.081 3.398 0.149 Rank 1-5 Thrift/propensity to save
10.510 6.823 4.382 4.146 InterceptSelling price - Rice Table 7. Testing Collusion
buying price quantities sold (dependent variable is rice; estimator is instrumental variables)
(in level) (in log)
356 415 Number of observations
0.066 0.550 R-squared
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. Factors of production
1. capital and labor (*)
0.798 0.026 2.738 0.438 log Working capital
0.940 0.077 -0.330 -0.137 log Manpower (in months/year)
1.816 0.341 -1.054 -0.976 share % family labor in total labor force
2. human capital
-0.273 -0.006 -2.711 -0.367 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
-1.044 -0.005 2.441 0.058 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.462 0.011 1.173 0.156 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-0.166 -0.005 -1.487 -0.251 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
3. social capital (*)
-1.168 -0.052 2.100 0.542 log Number of traders known
B. Location
-0.059 -0.008 1.238 0.570 Yes=1 In capital city
-0.655 -0.023 1.295 0.242 Yes=1 In another city
0.487 0.069 0.126 0.053 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
1.324 0.173 -1.296 -0.531 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
2.045 0.261 -2.393 -0.985 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
1.820 0.258 0.020 0.009 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
1.238 0.169 0.112 0.044 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-1.546 -0.493 3.727 6.272 Intercept
(*) Denotes instrumented variables. Instruments identical to instruments used in Table 3.Table 8. Modes of Transaction
Std. dev. Mean Unit
60.2% Yes=1 Price information obtained from other traders
28.3% Yes=1 Price information obtained from clients and suppliers
11.5% Yes=1 Price information obtained from messengers
31.9% 15.8% Share Share of purchases on credit
19.6% 13.6% Share Share of sales on credit
39.9% 38.6% Share Share of purchases from regular suppliers
27.7% 26.8% Share Share of sales from regular clients
84.5% Yes=1 Firm always inspect supplies
85.3% Yes=1 Firm's clients always inspect supplies























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tTable 10. Testing Modes of Transaction
Total sales Value added (dependent variable is in log)
676 625 Number of observations
0.590 0.538 R-squared
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. Mode of Transaction
4.271 0.468 4.833 0.643 Yes=1 Info. on prices from clients and suppliers
4.508 0.671 6.091 1.074 Yes=1 Info. on prices from messengers
1.665 0.353 1.396 0.352 Share Share of purchases with supplier credit
0.967 0.260 1.873 0.606 Share Share of sales with credit to client
1.953 0.232 1.236 0.176 Share Share of purchases from regular suppliers
3.363 0.646 3.543 0.815 Share Share of sales to regular clients
2.500 0.356 2.698 0.460 No=1 Firm always inspect quality of supplies
-1.672 -0.243 -1.717 -0.307 No=1 Clients always inspect quality of supplies
-0.989 -0.125 -2.971 -0.452 Yes=1 Firm places orders from suppliers
B. Factors of production
1. capital and labor
8.325 0.238 7.797 0.265 log Working capital
7.905 0.669 6.174 0.633 log Manpower (in months/year)
-2.150 -0.374 -1.858 -0.393 share % family labor in total labor force
2. human capital
-1.720 -0.153 -2.464 -0.260 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
1.214 0.019 1.000 0.019 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.273 0.020 0.384 0.033 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.398 -0.158 -1.338 -0.180 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
3. social capital
-2.378 -0.228 -1.396 -0.162 log Number of relatives in agric. trade
2.791 0.170 2.597 0.194 log Number of traders known
3.405 0.291 1.967 0.206 log Number of potential lenders
C. Location
-1.000 -0.354 -2.182 -1.336 Yes=1 In capital city
2.895 0.339 2.418 0.339 Yes=1 In another city
-0.886 -0.287 -2.082 -1.228 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-1.970 -0.635 -1.714 -0.994 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.060 -0.686 -1.233 -0.722 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.691 -0.240 -0.256 -0.154 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-1.600 -0.536 -0.135 -0.080 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
13.038 6.328 5.786 4.225 Intercept
Joint significance test
p-value F-stat. p-value F-stat. df
0.0000 7.24 0.0000 9.70 9 Joint test of mode of transaction variables
Endogeneity test:
p-value test p-value test df Testing mode of transactions variables
a. using linear predictors
0.7982 5.40 0.6612 6.77 9 Hausman test (chi-square)
0.8058 0.59 0.4540 0.98 9 Davidson and MacKinnon (F)
b. using probability (logit) and censored (tobit) predictors
0.2485 1.27 0.0110 2.41 9 Davidson and MacKinnon (F)Table 11. Instrumented Modes of Transaction
Total sales Value added (dependent variable is in log)
680 626 Number of observations
0.558 0.486 R-squared
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. Mode of Transaction, instrumented (*)
-0.755 -0.336 -1.713 -0.938 Yes=1 Info. on prices from clients and suppliers
-0.628 -0.386 -2.286 -1.772 Yes=1 Info. on prices from messengers
0.745 0.413 -0.217 -0.142 Share Share of purchases with supplier credit
-1.923 -1.333 -0.920 -0.778 Share Share of sales with credit to client
0.861 0.266 1.038 0.396 Share Share of purchases from regular suppliers
2.613 2.040 3.206 3.085 Share Share of sales to regular clients
1.183 0.568 0.854 0.496 No=1 Firm always inspect quality of supplies
-0.827 -0.458 -0.913 -0.606 No=1 Clients always inspect quality of supplies
0.568 0.329 -0.778 -0.564 Yes=1 Firm places orders from suppliers
B. Factors of production
1. capital and labor
7.019 0.236 6.182 0.249 log Working capital
7.280 0.742 6.742 0.852 log Manpower (in months/year)
-0.666 -0.142 -0.178 -0.046 share % family labor in total labor force
2. human capital
-1.012 -0.097 -1.831 -0.211 fem=1 Gender of owner/manager
0.712 0.013 0.508 0.011 level Years of schooling of owner/manager
-0.023 -0.002 -0.073 -0.008 log Years of experience in agricultural trade
-0.269 -0.041 0.016 0.003 Yes=1 Owner/manager speaks another language
3. social capital
-2.521 -0.317 -2.039 -0.312 log Number of relatives in agric. trade
3.104 0.274 2.789 0.303 log Number of traders known
3.458 0.325 2.535 0.297 log Number of potential lenders
C. Location
0.126 0.082 0.659 0.605 Yes=1 In capital city
3.240 0.430 2.940 0.479 Yes=1 In another city
-0.434 -0.195 -0.119 -0.085 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-0.931 -0.405 -0.083 -0.058 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-1.189 -0.543 -0.025 -0.018 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.471 -0.199 0.748 0.512 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-1.154 -0.487 0.853 0.585 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
10.190 5.737 3.180 2.663 Intercept
Joint significance test
p-value F-stat. p-value F-stat. df
0.2060 1.35 0.0390 1.98 9 Joint test of mode of transaction variables
(*) Predictors are Prob(X'bhat) for logit and by 0<=X'bhat<=1 for tobit.
Standard errors are uncorrected for the fact that certain regressors are instrumented.